Over the course of the last decade the central government of the People's Republic of China has utilized a national grant system to invest in the research and development of new dualuse cyber capabilities. In order to understand the defense implications of these investments, this research will examine how China is investing resources to develop new cyber capabilities for national security applications. Through the collection of publicly available sources in Mandarin and English, this research will analyze how the Chinese leadership views information technology research and development (R&D), as well as the role cyber R&D plays in China's various strategic development plans. This work also explores the organizational structure of China's cyber R&D base. The paper will conclude with a projection of how China might field new cyber capabilities for intelligence platforms, advanced weapons systems, and systems designed to support asymmetric warfare operations.
Introduction

Grants and Cyber Capabilities: A Civil-Military Cocktail
In order to advance national security and economic interests, the government of the PRC is using a national grant system to not only strengthen civil-military cooperation, but also to develop new cyber capabilities. The State High-Technology Research and Development Program (国家高技术研究发展), widely referred to as the 863 Program, is a nation-wide grant system that the central government uses to fund a variety of research and development (R&D) projects deemed to be of critical importance to the country. Through the analysis of how this grant system is being used to R&D inherently dual-use cyber capabilities, it is possible to interpret what types of information technology the Chinese may be seeking to field for C4ISR platforms and advanced weapons systems. However, before an in-depth analysis of these programs can take place, it is necessary to analyze how the Chinese leadership generally approach cyber capabilities.
Strategic Development Plans and Cyber R&D
China's various strategic development plans provide broad outlines that describe what the country's IT R&D priorities are for a given period of time. However, the strategies stop short of explicitly stating what technologies should be developed or how R&D funding should be allocated. The highest level versions of these strategies are known as Five-Year Plans (FYP), currently in its 12 th iteration (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) . Under the auspices of these FYPs, the Ministry of Science and Technology has released a number of cyber development plans that provide specific details as to which technologies should be developed. Other plans, like the 2006 National Outline for Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (zhongwen), signal the leadership's strategic vision for cyber capability development and implementation. Although sometimes bureaucratically isolated, these strategies share two primary objectives: improving indigenous technology innovation and strengthening civilian-military cooperation in the field of cyber research and development.
Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (MLP)
In 2006 the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Part commissioned the MLP in order to outline a medium-term (2006-2020) development strategy aimed at increasing the country's technological capabilities. The backbone of the MLP is a prioritized R&D hierarchy that emphasizes eleven 'key' research areas and eight types of 'frontier technologies. These areas and frontier technologies range from laser and aeronautics to national defense and public security applications. That said, Chinese policy makers are heavily emphasizing information technology R&D in the MLP. IT is one of only three technologies listed in both 'key research areas' and 'frontier technologies,' the other two being advanced energy and manufacturing systems.
The MLP goes into incredible detail when discussing how the central government should enhance technical research and development capabilities. Measures advocated include industryuniversity technology sharing programs, preferential laws for small-medium sized companies developing relevant technologies, and long-term central government financial support for R&D projects. The MLP also states that China's central government should "vigorously support" university-based frontier technology development, which helps explain why universities are the primary benefactors of government IT R&D grants.
Even though the MLP was published in 2006, the majority of cyber systems currently being researched and developed in China closely relate to the IT research priorities outlined in the MLP. Research areas listed in the frontier technologies' IT section include advanced computing, network and communication systems, virtual reality systems for military applications, and microelectronics.
1 Capabilities that fall under these four categories are also prioritized in China's other development strategies, including two consecutive Five-Year Plans. (863) is a national grant system whose primary objective is to "accelerate China's high-tech development." 12 The Ministry of Science and Technology plays a significant administrative role in the day-to-day operations of the Program. However, a so-called "steering group" appears to have a great deal of power managing major issues. The steering group coordinates 863 Program priorities with China's State Council, the country's top decision-making body. The group is composed of members from MOST, PLA General Armament Department, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), and the Ministry of Finance. 13 The exact bureaucratic power hierarchy within the steering group is ambiguous, but Chinese government sources list the General Armament Department as the sole entity responsible for planning and organizing the 863 Program's military-specific projects.
14 Internally, the Program is headed by Director Ma Songde and is organized into a number of expert groups responsible for selecting and administering grant projects. The Committee of Experts (COE) is the key powerbroker within the Program and has 44 members. In regards to IT R&D projects, the COE is divided into three panels -networks and communications (网络通信 技术), advanced computer technologies (先进计算技术) and information security technologies （信息安全技术）. These panels are comprised of individuals from government and industry and appear to be tasked with screening IT R&D grant applications. The strength of the China's cyber R&D base lies within its hybrid civil-military organizational structure. Chinese policy makers recognize the dual-use role of cyber capabilities and openly advocate utilizing the 863 Program's research base to develop new technologies. This has allowed the government to openly distribute 863 R&D funds to civilian organizations so that they can develop potential national security applications. For example, many of China's top civilian universities and research institutes are simultaneously developing cyber technologies with entities associated with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of Public Security.
22 23 Furthermore, Chinese policy makers are seeking to incorporate university-industry and military-industry collaborations into the cyber R&D base by awarding information technology R&D grants to state-owned enterprises and private companies.
Civilian Universities and Research Institutes
China's central government is employing civilian universities and research institutes to research and develop dual-use cyber systems. The 863 Program has designed a hierarchical grant management system incorporating the Ministry of Education, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Ministry of Public Security. 24 And although the exact relationship between these organizations and the 863 Program remains unclear, these three organizations have been designated "recommended divisions" tasked with overseeing the "primary units" responsible for the actual R&D of a capability. 863 grant funding is also being distributed directly to provincial level Ministries of Science and Technology. Once at the provincial ministry level, funding patterns suggest that cyber R&D grants are being awarded to computer science schools at local science and technology universities. This differs from 863 grants administered by the Ministry of Education, who in 2012 tended to award grants to China's top-tier universities (such as Beijing, Renmin, Tsinghua, Shanghai Jiaotong, etc.).
Industry
Many of China's largest telecommunications companies, including ZTE, Huawei, Haige and China Electronics Technology Group have received 863 IT R&D grants.
25 This is partially a result of the Chinese leadership advocating the development of civil-commercial-military cyber R&D parks. These parks, commonly referred to as high-tech development zones, are massive areas where high-tech companies and research institutes can enjoy a preferential business environment. Parks like the Wuhan East Lake High-Tech Zone are home to a wide variety of organizations that received 863 cyber R&D grants in 2012, including the Wuhan Institute of Posts and Telecommunications and the ZTE Corporation.
26 (Both Wuhan Institute and ZTE were awarded funds from the same grant category to develop fiber optic switch and network applications.)
In 2012, multiple municipal-level science and technology commissions (STCs) awarded 863 grants to both private and semi-autonomous companies located within that municipality's jurisdiction. Examples of this include the Chongqing STC administering a grant given to China 
National University of Defense Technology (NUDT)
Having been recognized by the State Council for its cyber developments in the fields of space technologies and high-performance computer systems, NUDT (国防科学技术大学) is one the primary national defense research institutions in China. The university emphasizes a doctrine called "Joint-Training," which focuses on training PLA officers for "informationized warfare" ( 信息化战争).
29 Through this training, dozens of research projects related to military applications are currently being pursued at the university. Although the majority of these projects are not being funded by 863 grants, NUDT has been awarded 863 funding to R&D microelectronics, information security technology, and virtual reality platforms. The specifics of these awarded grants have not yet been published but NUDT is currently developing a number of relevant military applications, including unmanned aerial vehicle and satellite control systems, target recognition software, and cryptography. regards to the dual-use nature of these grants, IEU prides itself on its military research strengths and "rejects any scientific research programs that have little relation with the actual combat." 32 Since the university is reluctant to accept non-military related research projects, yet they are recipients of 863 grants, it is probable that IEU's 863 grants are solely being used to fund the R&D of the PLA's cyber capabilities.
Technical Readiness Levels Through the analysis of China's R&D priorities and technical readiness levels (TRLs), it is possible to project what new cyber capabilities the Chinese might field for intelligence platforms and weapons systems. TRL assessments eliminate some speculation about operational capabilities because they help distinguish field--ready applications from projects in the infant stages of R&D. 33 That said, this research will focus on China's near--term C4ISR 34 capabilities that can be fielded for signals intelligence (SIGINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) platforms. The section will conclude with an examination of how China may incorporate new cyber technologies in advanced weapons systems designed to increase the PLA's asymmetric warfare capabilities.
SIGINT Systems Of the 863 Program's four key research priorities, projects being developed under the auspices of advanced computing and networking/communications are the most relevant for signals intelligence. R&D projects focusing on advanced information analytics have the potential to significantly impact the way China's foreign and domestic intelligence ministries collect and analyze information.
The 863 Program has awarded multiple grants to universities and research institutes across China for the development of natural language processing systems. 35 Such artificial intelligence platforms allow computers to extract meaningful data from human language input systems (IE a computer monitoring a telephone conversation and red flagging the data when a certain word was spoken). According to 863 grant applications the Chinese are looking to develop these technologies for Mandarin language processing. These systems could be used to better monitor domestic SIGINT traffic for surveillance and information control purposes. That said, if China is capable of fielding analytical platforms for Mandarin, it is possible that the systems could be reconfigured for foreign language monitoring capabilities. This is a logical progression because it is more difficult to develop systems that monitor tonal languages like Chinese than it is develop similar systems for non--tonal languages (English, Japanese, German, etc.). 36 A 2009 grant application calls for the development and demonstration of different platforms capable of controlling and monitoring computer networks. The application lists dozens of technologies but the most relevant for near--term field--ready SIGINT capabilities concerns a system utilizing deep packet inspections (DPIs) for data exfiltration. DPIs are commonly used as a network management tool because they monitor data as it flows through a network, often for virus and spam detection. However, DPIs can also be utilized for SIGINT capabilities like data mining, eavesdropping and censorship. 37 The 2009 application specifically calls for the development of a system that utilizes DPIs for network analysis and data extraction. More specifically, a multidimensional data extraction platform capable of characterizing user behaviors, monitoring and modeling the physical characteristics of data, and classifying languages. 38 China could field such a system for foreign SIGINT interceptions, monitoring and analysis. 39 Geospatial Intelligence Systems Throughout the 11 th and 12 th Five--Year periods, the 863 Program has been tasked with researching and developing projects related to Earth observation and navigation technologies. Within this R&D category, 863 grants are being awarded to develop cyber capabilities designed to support geospatial systems. Many of these cyber technologies can be used for both civilian space purposes as well as for the deployment, collection and analysis of geospatial C4ISR platforms and military systems.
The majority of cyber technologies being developed for geospatial projects concern navigation and positioning systems, remote sensing, and geographic information systems. Capabilities being funded by 863 to support these systems include high--performance parallel computing and debugging applications, heterogeneous data integration platforms, and highly advanced microelectronics. 40 
